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WEST VIRGINIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE
RESTATEMENTS OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS AND CONTRACTS
The following West Virginia annotations to some twenty
sections selected from the American Law Institute's Restatement
of the Law of Conflict of Laws and the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts are published for the purpose of indicating the na-
ture of the work that is being done to make the Restatements of
greater practical value to the bench and bar of the State. There
are between 600 and 650 sections to each of these Restatements
and the annotations presented here are samples only. When the
entire work is completed, the annotations will be published in
book form by the American Law Institute and thus made avail-
able to West Virginia lawyers at a nominal price.
The rules and comments are reproduced herein as they ap-
pear in the Restatement by the American Law Institute. The
illustrations given in the Restatement, however, are omitted. The
West Virginia annotation to each section follows the comment.
The work of annotating the Restatement of the Law of Con-
ffict of Laws is being done by Professor E. C. Dickinson of the
West Virginia University College of Law in cooperation with the
following committee from the West Virginia Bar Association:
Nelson C. Hubbard, Chairman, Charles McCamic, Kent B. Hall,
Robert T. Donley, L. S. Schwenck, A. G. Hughes. The annota-
tions to the Contracts Restatement are being prepared by Asso-
ciate Professor Thomas C. Billig of the College of Law in co-
operation with the following committee from the Bar Associa-
tion: 0. E. Wyckoff, Chairman, L. A. Johnson, Fred L. Lemley,
James R. Moreland, Jed W. Robinson.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Chapter 4.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS.
TOPIC C. JURISDICTION OVER STATUS.
TITLE I. JURISDICTION OVER STATUS IN GENERAL.
Section 116. NoTIcE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial juris-
diction over the status of a person, unless a method of notifica-
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tion is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him
knowledge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an op-
portunity to be heard.
Comments:
a. A state has jurisdiction over the domestic status of per-
sons domiciled within the state (Section 60).
b. Although a state has jurisdiction over the status of a
person, a proper notice to the person is essential to the exercise
of judicial jurisdiction over the status. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States a decree
affecting the status rendered without proper notice is invalid.
Annotation:
No West Virginia case directly in point has been found, but
in Woodford v. Woodford, 161 S. E. 3 (W. Va. 1931) the court
refused to recognize an Ohio decree of divorce entered within six
weeks from the first publication of process, the Ohio Code pro-
viding that in a suit for divorce "the cause may be heard and
decided after the expiration of six weeks from the service of sum-
mons, or the first publication of notice".
The requirement for notice finds statutory recognition in
Code, 48 - 2 - 10,1 providing for order of publication in divorce
litigation.
TITLE II. JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE.
Section 117. JURIsDIcTION OF STATE OF DomICIL OF SPOUSES.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dis-
solve the marriage of spouses both domiciled in the state.
Comments:.
a. Marriage is a status. While it is an intangible thing and
without any situation in space, it is nevertheless of peculiar in-
terest to the state in which the spouses have their domicil and
where in the great majority of cases the family life is permanent-
ly carried on. The state of domieil is so peculiarly interested in
the relation of marriage that it has jurisdiction over the status
and may put an end to it.
b. Statutes which give particular courts the power to grant
divorces often require that one party (usually the libellant, that
'When "Code", without date, is cited in annotations, reference is to thq
Official Code of West Virginia 1931,
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is, the party bringing the proceeding) should have resided for a
certain time within the state. Residence for this purpose ordin-
arily means domicil (Section 12, Comment c). The requirement
that the residence must have continued for a certain number of
months or years is not jurisdictional, in the sense in which that
word is used in the Restatement of this Subject; and the finding
of the court on the length of residence is conclusive in the courts
of another state provided the jurisdictional requirement of dom-
icil at the time suit is brought is satisfied.
c. As in the case of any judgment (Section ), a decree
of divorce may be subject to attack on equitable grounds, such
as fraud in obtaining jurisdiction.
Annotation:
In Carty v. Carty, 70 W. Va. 146, 150, 73 S. E. 310, 312 (1911),
the court says: "It is the domicil of one or both the parties in
this state, at the time of the suit, that gives jurisdiction under
our statutes. No other basis of jurisdiction is fixed."
Code, 48 - 2 - 6, gives the circuit court jurisdiction for di-
vorces. Code, 48 - 2 - 9, provides that "the suit .... for divorce,
shall, if the defendant be a resident of this state, be brought in
the county in which the parties last cohabited, or, at the option
of the plaintiff, in the county in which the defendant resides;
but if the defendant be not a resident of this state, the suit shall
be brought in the county in which the plaintiff resides." Where
suit was brought "in the county in which the parties last cohabit-
ed" the defendant being a resident of another county, but such
facts were not alleged in the bill, the lower court was wholly
without jurisdiction. Jennings v. McDougle, 83 W. Va. 186, 98
S. E. 162 (1919).
Ch. 64, See. 7, Code 1923, provided: "and in no case shall
a suit for divorce be maintainable unless the plaintiff be an
actual bona fide citizen of this state, and shall have resided in
the state for at least one year immediately preceding the bring-
ing of the suit." That residence and domicil of one foreign born
are sufficient to give the status of "citizenship" required by this
statute was held in Vachikinas v. Vachikinas, 91 W. Va. 181, 112
S. E. 316 (1922). That residence under this section meant dom-
icil, see authorities cited in annotation under Section 12 of the
3
et al.: West Virginia Annotations to the Restatements of Conflict of Laws
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1933
130 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICTS
Restatement.2  Material changes in the subject matter of this
section were made in the revised code of 1931. Code, 48 - 2 - 8.
The requirement of citizenship was omitted and the period of
residence "made to depend on the cause of divorce, whether the
cause of action arose at a time when one of the parties was a bona
fide resident of this state, or before becoming such, and whether
personal service within the state may be had upon the defendant".
Revisers' Note to Code, 48 - 2 - 8.
In the absence of any showing of fraud upon the court, or
lack of jurisdiction, a decree of divorce rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction in another state or territory of the United
States, upon an order of publication duly executed pursuant to
the laws of such state or territory, is entitled to the same faith and
credit in the courts of this state as in the state and territory
wherein rendered. Caswell v. Caswell, 84 W. Va. 575, syl. 2, 100
S. E. 482 (1919). And see State v. Goudy, 94 W. Va. 542, 119
S. E. 685 (1923).
Section 118. STATE or DomIciL OF NmTHER SPousE.
A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction to
dissolve a marriage where neither spouse is domiciled within
the state.
Comments:
a. Neither the appearance of the defendant spouse nor a
finding of domicil by the court can create jurisdiction, since the
action of the court if valid is to dissolve the status, and therefore
2 The portion of annotation under Sec. 12 to which reference is made is
as follows:
JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE
As jurisdiction for divorce is based on domicil of at least one of the
parties to the suit within the state, the requirement as to residence in Code,
48 - 2 - 8, would seem to be in addition to that of domicil. Ch. 64, § 7,
Code 1923, required that the plaintiff be "an actual bona fide citizen" and
have resided in the state for at least one year. That domicil and residence
for the requisite period were sufficient to give the status of citizenship re-
quired by that statute was held in Vachikinas v. Vachikinas, 91 W. Va. 181,
syl. 2, 112 S. E. 319 (1922). That both domieil and residence were required
under that section before its amendment in 1915 is evident from the opin-
ion in Carty v. Carty, 70 W. Va. 146, 73 S. E. 310 (1911); and the amend-
ment requiring that the plaintiff shall be an actual bona fide citizen of this
state, and shall have resided in the state for at least one year immediately
preceding the bringing of the suit, has not changed its interpretation in this
respect. Boos v. Boos, 93 W. Va. 727, 117 S. E. 616 (1923). To the same
effect see Parks v. Parks, 109 W. Va. 138, 141, 153 S. E. 242, 243 (1930).
While in the revised code a new term - "bona fide resident of this State"-
is used, (Code, 48 - 2 - 8), it is not probable that a different interpretation
will be placed upon "resident".
4
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is in rem, and the thing to be acted on must be within the juris-
diction of the court if the action is to be effective and recognized
in other states.
b. A person who has asked for and obtained a decree of
divorce from a court which had no jurisdiction, or a person who
takes advantage of the divorce by remarrying, is precluded from
disputing the validity of the divorce in a matter concerning only
claims as spouse against the other spouse.
Annotation:
For divorces granted in West Virginia, the statutory re-
quirement of residence of one of the parties (Code, 48 - 2 - 8)
is in accord with the principle of this section if the term "bona
fide resident" is held to mean one domiciled in the state. For
the meaning of residence in divorce statutes, see Section 12 of the
Restatement and authorities cited in annotation thereunder.8
Whether a divorce granted in another state where neither
party is domiciled will be regarded as void for lack of jurisdiction
has not been passed upon by our court. One court has recognized
the validity of such a divorce. Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138
N. E. 490 (1923).
See annotation under Section 123 for jurisdictional require-
ment in suit for annulment.
Section 119. STATE OF DoIcmi OF ONE SPOUSE.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dis-
solve the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled within
the state and the other is domiciled outside the state, if
(a) the spouse who is not domiciled in the state
(i) has consented that the other spouse acquire a
separate home; or
(ii) by his or her misconduct has ceaser to have the
right to object to the acquisition of such sep-
arate home; or
(iii) is personally subject to the jurisdiction of the
state which grants the divorce;
or
(b) the state was the last state in which the spouses were
domiciled together as man and wife.
8 See preceding note.
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Comments:
a. Two interests are involved in the granting of a divorce;
that of the state of domicil in the existence of the status and that
of the defendant spouse in the plaintiff spouse. Since the result
of the action is to deprive the defendant spouse of his interest
in the other spouse, the court must in some way acquire jurisdic-
tion over that interest.
b. If one spouse consents that the other spouse acquire a
separate home, the interest of the former spouse is subject to the
action of any state in which the other spouse may establish his
home and thus acquire a domicil.
c. If the misconduct of one spouse is such that the other
leaves him without being guilty of desertion and acquires a new
domicil, the interest of the former spouse is subject to the action
of any state in which the other spouse acquires a new domicil.
In cases where the misconduct of one spouse is necessary to
give jurisdiction to a court at the domiil of the other spouse,
such misconduct becomes a jurisdictional fact; and another court,
finding the fact otherwise, will hold the former court to have been
without jurisdiction, and will refuse to give effect to its judgment
(see Section ).
d. If a defendant spouse is served with process within the
state in which an action for divorce is brought against him by a
plaintiff spouse who is domiciled in the state, or appears in the
action, or otherwise becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the
court in which the action is pending (see Section 82), the court
has jurisdiction to grant the divorce.
e. The plaintiff in a divorce suit always fills the require-
ments of Clause (a), Subelause (iii), since by bringing the suit
he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the state in all matters
concerning the suit (see Section 88).
f. If suit is brought at the last domicil where the spouses
lived together, the party who has left that domicil cannot justly
complain of being called back there to litigate the question of
divorce by the spouse still domiciled therein.
g. Jurisdiction in this case is analogous to jurisdiction to
deprive a person of ownership in a thing (see Section 52).
Annotation:
The statutes and decisions in West Virginia are not in entire
accord with this section of the Restatement. Before the Revision
of 1931 the statute governing the granting of divorces allowed
6
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divorce at the domicil of the plaintiff and provided for order of
publication where the defendant was not personally served. Ch.
64, § 7, Code 1923. Since the Statute required the plaintiff to
be a resident, the domicil of the defendant alone in the state was
not sufficient to give jurisdiction. White v. White, 106 W. Va.
569, 146 S. E. 376 (1929); Parks v. Parks, 109 W. Va. 138, 141,
153 S. E. 242, 243 (1930). But where a non-resident wife, whose
husband was a citizen of West Virginia, sued him here for main-
tenance and he filed an answer in the nature of a cross bill pray-
ing for a divorce, the court held that she might then fie an
amended pleading asking for similar relief; the ffling of the cross
bill by the defendant conferring jurisdiction for that purpose.
Hale v. Hale, 104 W. Va. 254, 139 S. E. 754 (1927). A material
change in the law in this respect is made by the Code of 1931. By
48 - 2 - 8, a suit for divorce can be maintained when either of the
parties has been a bona fide resident of this state for the required
time.
No reported case has been found in which the West Virginia
court in granting a divorce has exceeded the bounds prescribed
in this section. In both Carty v. Carty, 70 W. Va. 146, 73 S. E.
310 (1911), and Vachikinas v. Vachikinas, 91 W. Va. 181, 112
S. E. 316 (1922), the husband by his misconduct had ceased to
have the right to object to the acquisition of such separate home
(see (a) (ii) alove). It is not clear whether jurisdiction in Boos
v. Boos, 93 W. Va. 727, 117 S. E. 616 (1923) is to be sustained on
this same ground or on the theory of "matrimonial domicil"
(see (b) above). An attitude less liberal than expressed in the
Restatement is shown in the case of State v. Goodrich, 14 W. Va.
834, 847 (1878), where Judge Green says: "The true position is
I think that a state court, where the parties married and resided,
and one of them continues to reside there, though one of them
deserts the other and removes to another state, may grant a di-
vorce, though the grounds of the divorce, such as adultery, may
have occurred outside the state. If, however, after the marriage
both parties move to another state, and one of them there com-
mits adultery, and afterwards the other again removes to the
State where the parties were married, in such case it is doubtful
whether a divorce could be granted by the courts of the State in
which the parties were married." Under the later decisions this
doubt would seem to be removed. Carty v. Carty; Boos v. Boos,
suprat. And by Code, 48 - 2 - 8 a divorce certainly could be grant-
ed in such a case.
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That the West Virginia court will recognize the validity of a
decree from another state, the domicil of one party, even though
the defendant was not before the court, is indicated by the fol-
lowing: In Campbell v. Switzer, 74 W. Va. 509, 510, 82 S. E.
319 (1914), the court says: "Under the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution, the Kentucky decree has the
same effect in this State as it has in the State in which it was
pronounced." And in Caswell v. Caswell, 84 W. V. 575, 584, 100
S. E. 482, 485 (1919) the following language is found: "The copy
of the proceedings from the district court of Logan County, Okla-
homa, being duly and properly certified, and it not appearing
therefrom that the court was without jurisdiction, and the decree
being such as is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of
that territory, now the State of Oklahoma, the policy of our law
as declared in See. 19, Ch. 130, Code, (Code, 57 - 1 - 12) entitles
it to the same faith and credit in the courts of this State. Had-
dock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, on which the plaintiff relies, does
not determine the law of this State . . . . But the policy of our
State as shown in the Statute above referred to, differs from the
policy of the State of New York." As the Restatement professes
to follow the rule of Haddock v. Haddock, (supra), the West Vir-
ginia law would seem to go further in the matter of recognition
of foreign divorce decrees than this section of the Restatement.
TITLE III. JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN OTHER MARITAL SUITS.
Section 120. JUDIcIAL SEPARATION.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to grant
judicial separation to any spouse petitioning therefor.
Comments:
a. The order for judicial separation, or divorce from bed
and board, does not affect the existence of the marriage, but only
protects the spouse against certain acts of the other spouse while
they are within the state.
b. If a court is to do more, and affect the marriage rela-
tion by permanently depriving one spouse of the right to have the
other live with him, the proceeding becomes a qualified dissolu-
tion of the marriage, and the requirements of jurisdiction are the
same as in the case of divorce. This is the type of relief pro-
vided in many American States.
8
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Annotation:
The West Virginia Statutes providing for limited divorce
clearly fall within the description in Comment (b). Code, 48 -
2 - 5, 16, and 20. The nature of this relief under the former
statute is set out in Chapman v. Chapman, 70 W. Va. 522, 525,
74 S. E. 661, 663 (1912) as follows: "A decree of divorce a mensa
is by See. 12, Ch. 64, of the Code, a decree of perpetual separa-
tion; it operates on the after acquired property of the parties,
and upon the personal rights and legal capacities, the same as a
decree a vinculo, except that neither party is permitted to marry
again during the life of the other." (See criticism of this opin-
ion in Revisers' Note to Code, 48 - 2 - 16.) Jurisdictional re-
quirements are the same as for a divorce a vinculo. Code, 48 -
2 - 6.
Section 121. RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to grant
against any spouse subject to its jurisdiction restitution of
conjugal rights.
Comment:
a. This proceeding, by its nature, can be effective, only with-
in the state. This proceeding is not one which under the laws
of the various States is employed in the United States. But
where courts are empowered to grant restitution of conjugal
rights, the jurisdiction to exercise the power is as stated in this
Section.
Annotation:
Analogous to this type of litigation is the suit to affirm a
marriage where doubt exists as to its validity, provided for in
Code, 48 - 2 - 2.
Section 122. NULLITY FROM THE BEGINNING.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to nul-
lify a marriage from its beginning only in so far as the mar-
riage, in respect to the requirement for its validity which it is
claimed was not satisfied, was governed by its law.
Comments:
a. As is stated (Section 129), a marriage is in most partic-
ulars governed by the law of the place of marriage; and if in-
validity is claimed in one of these particulars, and the decree of
9
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nullity will operate to make the marriage invalid from its incep-
tion, a decree of nullity can be granted only by a court of the
state where the marriage took place.
b. If a policy exists in the state of domicil of one party,
based on strongly held grounds, which does not permit the parties
to marry one another, the law of the state of domicil will not
create the status of marriage as a result of the contract (Section
140). If nullity of marriage is claimed on such a ground, only
tlfie state of domieil at the time of marriage has jurisdiction to
grant nullity.
Annotation:
On facts similar to those in illustration 3,' above, a Virginia
judgment declaring a marriage a nullity on the ground of rela-
tionship was held to be valid although the marriage had been per-
formed in Washington, D. C., where it was legal. Kelly v. Scott,
5 Gratt. 479 (Va. 1849).
Under Ch. 109, § 1, Va. Code of 1860, in force in West Vir-
ginia until superseded by Ch. 64, § 1, Code of 1868, two kinds of
defective marriages were recognized. Marriages between a white
person and a negro, and between persons either of whom had a
husband or wife living, were absolutely void without any decree.
Marriages prohibited because of consanguinity or affinity and
marriages of insane or physically incapable persons, were void
from date of decree of nullity. It was held in Stewart v. Van-
dervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 S. E. 736 (1890), that a marriage oc-
curring while § 1, Ch. 109, Code of Va. 1860, was in force, be-
tween persons, one of whom had a husband then living, is ab-
solutely void without a decree; and although suit to declare the
nullity of such marriage was brought under the Code of 1868,
no alimony could be decreed.
Section 123. NULIiTy FRoM DATE OF DEcREE.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to an-
nul from the date of the decree the marriage of spouses if it
would have jurisdiction to grant a divorce.
Comment:
a. This proceeding is provided for by statute in some states.
'Illustration 3 in the Restatement is as follows-
"A and B, aunt and nephew, domiciled in state X, are married in state
Y. A brings suit for nullity in X on the ground of relationship. The de-
cree may be granted."
10
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It differs from that described in Section 122, in that it destroys
the marriage not from its inception, but only from the date of
the decree. It differs from divorce in that the cause existed at
the time of the marriage instead of arising after it. As its effect
on the marriage is the same as that of divorce, it requires the same
jurisdiction in the court.
Annotation:
Annulment under the present West Virginia statutes in of
the type covered in this section of the Restatement. Code, 48 -
2 - 1, 2, 3. Under the former statute, Ch. 64, § 7, Code 1923,
jurisdiction was the same as in suits for divorce. A material
change in this respect has been made in the revised code. Code,
48 - -2 - 7, is as follows: "No suit to annul or affirm a marriage
shall be maintainable unless at the commencement of the suit one
of the parties is a bona fide resident of this State, except that
in the case of a suit to annul a marriage that was performed in
this State it shall not be necessary, if a matrimonial domicile has
not been established elsewhere, that one of the parties be such a
resident." As a suit for annulment can be maintained under
this statute when neither party is a bona fide resident of the state,
the jurisdictional requirement is not the same as for divorce and
the statute is clearly contrary to the rule of the Restatement.
Whether full faith and credit would be given in other states to a
decree so rendered would be doubtful.
Jurisdiction to annul an incestuous marriage consummated in
Pennsylvania was exercised in Martin v. Martin, 54 W. Va. 301,
46 S. E. 120 (1903). Both plaintiff and defendant apparently
were domiciled in West Virginia both at the time of marriage and
when suit was brought. See also Perkey v. Perkey, 87 W. Va.
656, 106 S. E. 40 (1921), as to annulment on the ground that
plaintiff was under age.
Section 124. AmmoNy.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to grant
alimony to one spouse if it has jurisdiction over the other
spouse; or, if it has jurisdiction over his property, to the extent
of such property.
comments:
a. Alimony is ordinarily granted in connection with divorce
proceedings; but may be given when no divorce is granted, or
even asked for,
11
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b. Alimony may be granted by a personal decree against a
spouse, or by a decree that binds his property only.
c. The decree for alimony being the creation of a purely
personal duty of the spouse, like a judgment for damages, there
must either be jurisdiction over the person himself to create the
duty, or jurisdiction over a thing to apply it to the payment of
the claim for alimony.
Annotation:
No West Virginia case directly in point has been found.
However, in Coger v. Coger, 48 W. Va. 135, 35 S. E. 823 (1900),
it was held that a decree awarding alimony to the wife, rendered
before the service of process upon the husband, although he was
within the jurisdiction of the court, was void, and the court quoted
with approval the following from the Ene. of Plead. & Prac., vol.
1, page 413: "And although a divorce ex 'parte may be obtained
on constructive service, yet no alimony can be decreed, unless the
defendant appears to the action in person or by attorney or has
been duly served with process within the jurisdiction of the
court. "
By Ch. 64, § 11, Code 1923, a court was authorized to award
alimony "upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage and also
upon decreeing a divorce." The words "upon decreeing the dis-
solution of a marriage" apply not to marriages absolutely void
without decree but to those declared void from the time of de-
cree, which until such decree are valid. Stewart v. Vandervort,
34 W. Va. 524, 12 S. E. 736 (1890). This made it possible, ap-
parently, to decree alimony in any annulment suit in West Vir-
ginia, since the statute (Ch. 64, § 1) purported to annul only
from the date of decree. In the section of the revised code pro-
viding for alimony (Code, 42 - 2 - 15), the term "dissolution of
marriage" is not used. While the avowed purpose of this omis-
sion was "to provide for maintenance of the parties only in case
of divorce" (Revisers' Note to Code, 48 - 2 - 15), it would seem
that it will merely prevent the decreeing of alimony in annul-
ment proceedings, as a new section (Code, 48 - 2 - 29) expressly
authorizes the Circuit Court in Chancery to decree alimony and
separate maintenance independently of proceedings for divorce.
Such right has been recognized in Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. &
M. 507 (1810); Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. 662 (Va. 1826);
Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205, 73 S. E. 716 (1912) ; Huff v. Huff,
73 W. Va. 330, syl. 4, 80 S. E. 846 (1913) ; State v. Maxwell, 89
12
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W. Va. 31, 108 S. E. 418 (1921). What appears to be a contrary
holding in Chapman v. Parsons, 66 W. Va. 307, 66 S. E. 461
(1909), cited in Revisers' Note to Code, 48 - 2 - 29, is explainable
on the ground that in that case the husband had previously ob-
tained a divorce from bed and board and was thereby relieved
from further duty to maintain his wife.
In Lang v. Lang, supra, at 210, the court says: "The venue
of a suit for maintenance without divorce is in no wise controlled
by the statute in relation to jurisdiction in divorce suits. The
place of suit is governed by the laws applying to ordinary suits
for the vindication of legal or equitable rights." This seems to
be changed by Code, 48 - 2 - 29, which authorizes "the circuit
court of any county that would have jurisdiction of a suit for
divorce between the parties" to decree alimony and separate
maintenance to the wife.
Code, 48 - 2 - 15, also gives the court the right to alter or
revise the decree "concerning the maintenance of the parties, or
either of them, and make a new decree concerning the same, as
the altered circumstances or needs of the parties may render
necessary to meet the ends of justice." Under the earlier statute
no such right was given. Cariens v. Cariens, 50 W. Va. 113, 73
S. E. 332 (1901). But the court had the power to reserve the
right to make such changes as the changed circumstances of the
parties and the principles of justice might require. Henrie v.
Henrie, 71 W. Va. 131, syl. 1, 76 S. E. 837 (1912) ; and in Sperry
v. Sperry, 80 W. Va. 142, syl. 6, 92 S. E. 574 (1917), it was held
that the court should reserve this power and if it failed to do so,
the error could be corrected on appeal. See Revisers' Note to
Code, 48 - 2 - 15.
Alimony orders from courts of other states are treated sub-
sequently under judgments. See, however, Stewart v. Stewart,
27 W. Va. 127 (1885).
TITLE IV. JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY.
Section 125. GUARDIANSHIP OF TE PERSON.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to de-
termine the custody of children or create the status of guardian
of the person only if the domicil of the person placed under
custody or guardianship. is within the state.
13
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Comment:
a. A guardian of the person may be the guardian of an in-
fant, or the guardian of an adult person of unsound mind; or
without the appointment of guardian of an infant the same status
may be created by awarding the custody of a child to one of its
parents. The question of custody and guardianship is fully con-
sidered later in Sections 152 to 159 inclusive.
Annotation:
Ch. 64, § 11, Code 1923, gave to the court, upon rendering a
decree of divorce, authority to make an award of the custody of
the children, and subsequent modifications thereof. It further
provided: "And whether the divorce be granted or not, if the
parties are living separate and apart from each other, the court
may make such' order or decree . . . . as to the court may seem
proper", concerning the custody and maintenance of minor
children. In the face of this clear language, it was held in Lord
v. Lord, 80 W. Va. 547, 553, 92 S. E. 749 (1917), that this statute
confers no authority upon the court to disturb the custody of the
child or children of the parties to a divorce suit on refusal to de-
cree a divorce. Code, 48 - 2 - 15, gives this authority to the
court.
In Post v. Post, 95 W. Va. 155, 159, 120 S. E. 385, 387 (1923),
the court uses language which supports the requirement of dom-
icil in this section of the Restatement. It said: "Such conditions
and circumstances may develop from time to time as would war-
rant the court in entering new orders relative to the welfare of
the children. To make this possible it may be necessary for the
circuit court to require both children to be kept within its juris-
diction". But in Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va. 124, syl. 1,
81 S. E. 706 (1914), it was held that a decree in an Indiana di-
vorce suit "was valid and binding upon the parties in this state,
in the award of the custody of the children, even though so much
of it as grants the divorce may be void and the children may have
been beyond the jurisdiction of the court at the time of the rendi-
tion thereof". This seems to be clearly contrary to the rule of
this section of the Restatement.
Section 126. TEMPORARY GUARDIANSHIP.
A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to pro-
tect from harm a person found within its territory by appoint-
ing a temporary guardian of such person,
14
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Comment:
a. While this relation does not create the status of guardian
and ward, and gives the person appointed no power outside the
state, it gives to the temporary protector complete power within
the state of his appointment in anything relating to the protection
and welfare of the person to be protected; but it does not super-
sede the right of the parent or guardian to appear and claim the
child (Sections 155, 159).
Annotation:
Applications of the exercise of jurisdiction dealt with in this
section are found in Code, 49 - 3 - 1 to 28, dealing with delinquent
and dependent children.
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Chapter 3.
FORMATION OF INFORMAL CONTRACTS
TOPIC B. MANIFESTATION OR ASSENT
Section 20. MA-NIFESTATION OF MUTUAL ASSENT.
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an in-
formal contract is essential to its formation and the acts by
which such assent is manifested must be done with the intent
to do those acts; but, except as qualified by Sections 55, 71 and
72, neither mental assent to the promises in the contract nor
real or apparent intent that the promises shall be legally bind-
ing is essential.
Comment:
a. Mutual assent to the formation of informal contracts is
operative only to the extent that it is manifested. Moreover, if
the manifestation is at variance with the mental intent, subject to
the slight exception stated in Section 71, it is the expression which
is controlling. Not mutual assent but a manifestation indicating
such assent is what the law requires. Nor is it essential that the
parties are conscious of the legal relations which their words or
acts give rise to. It is essential, however, that the acts manifest-
ing assent shall be done intentionally. That is, there must be a
conscious will to do those acts; but it is not material what in-
duces the will. Even insane persons may so act; but a somnam-
bulist could not.
Annotation:
West Virginia, in effect at least, is in accord with this sec-
tion. There is an apparent difficulty with the "manifestation"
element as the Supreme Court of Appeals ordinarily has not used
that particular word. See the following cases for pertinent and
interesting terminology:
Adams v. Hazen, 123 Va. 304, 96 S. E. 741 (1918), cited in
Virginia Export Coal Co. v. Rowland Land Co., 100 W. Va. 559,
580, 131 S. E. 253 (1926). (Mutual assent).
Shrewsbury v. Tufts, 41 W. Va. 212, 221, 222, 23 W. Va.
692 (1895). (Indiscriminate use of assent and consent).
16
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Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 744, 8 S. E. 743 (1888).
(Assent must be mutual and intended to bind both sides).
Watson v. Coast, 35 W. Va. 463, 472, 14 IV. Va. 249 (1891).
(Notice of acceptance). (Coast could not hold back a secret men-
tal reservation against the square language of his contract).
Plate v. Durst, 42 W. Va. 63, 71, 24 S. E. 580 (1896). (Ex-
pressed intent prevails).
Hunter v. Tolbard, 47 W. Va. 258, 262, 34 S. E. 737 (1899).
(Drunkenness resulting in absolute want of understanding).
Parks v. Morris, Layfield & Co., 63 W. Va. 51, 53, 59 S. E.
753 (1907). (The minds of the parties must meet in a consum-
mated contract).
Martin v. Ewing, 164 S. E. 859, 861 (W. Va. 1932). ("A
sine qua non of all contracts is that there must be mutuality -
a meeting of the minds of the parties.").
McCully v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 18 W. Va. 782, 786 (1881).
(All the terms must be mutually agreed upon).
Meadows v. Ins. Co., 104 W. Va. 580, 583, 584, 140 S. E. 552
(1927). (Concurrence of minds). (Assent must be mutual).
(Unity of concordance).
Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148, 19 S. E. 540, Syl. 2 (1894).
("A mere proposal to sell land does not become a sale until ac-
ceptance and notice of acceptance given the proposer.").
Meredith v. Shakespeare, 96 W. Va. 229, 122 S. E. 520 (1924).
(Marriage annullment in wvhich mental or real intent prevailed
over the objective or manifested intent).
Although the West Virginia cases do not speak of "mani-
festation," of assent'it seems likely that "manifested" or "ex-
pressed" assent is understood. See Richmond Eng. Corp. v. Loth,
135 Va. 110, 152, 115 S. E. 774 (1923), quoting Williston, Con-
tracts, § 22; Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 759, 8 S. E. 743
(1888), quoting 1 Benj., Sales, § 39, and 1 Story, Contracts, §
498.
Note that Meredith v. Shakespeare, supra, and perhaps Hun-
ter v. Tolbard, supra, are exceptions to the rule that manifested
assent prevails over mental intent.
Section 21. ACTS AS MANIFESTATION OF ASSENT.
The manifestation of mutual assent may consist wholly or
partly of acts, other than written or spoken words.
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Comment:
a. Words are not the only medium of expression. Conduct
may often convey as clearly as words a promise or an assent to a
proposed promise, and where no particular requirement of form is
made by the law a condition of the validity or enforceability of a
contract, there is no distinction in the effect of a promise whether
it is expressed (1) in writing, (2) orally, (3) in acts, or (4)
partly in one of these ways and partly in others.
Annotation:
West Virginia is in accord with this section.
Duquesne Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mg. Co., 90 W. Va. 673,
112 S. E. 219 (1922). (Acceptance of offer to buy lumber by
conduct of seller in filling order).
Accord: Wood & Brooks Co. v. D. E. Hewit Lumber Co., 89
W. Va. 254, 109 S. E. 242 (1921).
John L. Rowan & Co. v. Hull, 55 W. Va. 335, 47 S. E. 92
(1904). (Agency to sell farm accepted not, by writing but by
actual solicitation of purchasers).
See Richmond Engineering Corp. v. Loth, 135 Va. 110, 152,
115 S. E. 774 (1923), quoting Williston, Contracts, Section 22a,
to the effect that assent may be shown by acts as well as by words.
Section 22. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE.
The manifestation of mutual assent almost invariably takes
the form of an offer or proposal by one party accepted by the
other party or parties.
Comment:
a. This rule is rather one of necessity than of law. In the
nature of the case one party must ordinarily first announce what
he will do before there can be any manifestation of mutual assent.
It is theoretically possible for a third person to state a suggested
contract to the parties and for them to say simultaneously that
they assent to the suggested bargain, but such a case is so rare,
and the decision of it so clear that it is practically negligible.
Annotation:
.The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has stated
many times that a contract requires an offer and an acceptance.
As to this elementary point, see the following cases: M cCully's
Adm'r v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 18 W. Va. 782 Syl. 6 (1881) ; Dyer
18
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v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148, 19 S. E. 540, Syl. 2 (1894); Shrewsbury
v. Tufts, 41 W. Va. 212, 23 S. E. 692, Syl. 1 (1895); John L.
Rowan & Co. v. Hull, 55 W. Va. 335, S40, 47 S. E. 92 (1904);
Parks v. Morris, Layfield & Co., 63 W. Va. 51, 53, 59 S. E. 735
(1907); John v. Elkins, 63 W. Va. 158, 162, 59 S. E. 961 (1907)
and cases cited; Hollauer v. Fire Association, 83 W. Va. 401, 98
S. E. 441, Syl. 2 (1919); Meadows v. American Eagle Fire Ins.
Co., 104 W. Va. 580, 583, 140 S. E. 552 (1927) and cases cited.
In the latter case the Supreme Court of Appeals said, per Lynch,
J. (p. 583): "A contract for insurance, like any other contract,
consists generally of two prerequisites - an offer or application
and its acceptance."
No West Virginia decision was found involving the simul-
taneous assent of two parties to a bargain suggested by a third.
Section 23. NECESSITY OF COMUNICATION OF AN OFFER. -
Except as qualified by Section 70, it is essential to the ex-
istence of an offer that it be a proposal by the offeror to the
offeree, and that it becomes known to the offeree. It is not
essential that the manifestation shall accurately convey the
thought in the offeror's mind.
Comment:
a. Two manifestations of willingness to make the same bar-
gain do not constitute a contract unless one is made with reference
to the other. An offeree, therefore, cannot accept an offer unless
it has been communicated to him by the offeror. This may be
done through the medium of an agent; but mere information in-
directly received by one party that another is willing to enter
into a certain bargain is not an offer by the latter.
Annotation:
The first illustration used by the Restatement ndicates that
at this point it is concerned primarily with the so-called "re-
ward" cases. It adopts the majority view of Fitch v. Snedeker,
38 N. Y. 248, 97 Am. Dec. 791 (1868) requiring knowledge by
the offeree of the promised reward at the time he performs the
requested service in order to bind the offeror contractually, rather
than the opposite minority view expressed in Dawkins v. Sapping-
ton, 26 Ind. 199 (1866). No West Virginia "reward" case was
found, but language contained in several of the decisions cited
in previous annotations indicates that the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals would follow the majority view.
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The second illustration employed reads as follows: "A sends
B an offer through the mail to sell A's horse for $500.00. While
this offer is in the mail, B, in ignorance thereof, mails to A an
offer to pay $500.00 for the horse. There is no communication
of A's offer, and there is no contract." No West Virginia case
was found which involved "crossed offers".
Section 24. OFFER DEInumx.
An offer is a promise which is in its terms conditional upon
an act, forbearance or return promise being given in exchange
for the promise or its performance. An offer is also a contract,
commonly called an option, if the requisites of a formal or an
informal contract exist, or if the rule stated in Section 47 is
applicable.
Comment:
a. In an offer for a unilateral contract the offeror's promise
is conditional upon an act other than a promise being given ex-
cept in cases covered by Section 57. In an offer for a bilateral
contract the offeror's promise is always conditional upon a re-
turn promise being given. The return promise may be in the
form of assent to the proposal in the offer. In order that a promise
shall amount to an offer, performance of the condition in the
promise must appear by its terms to be the price or exchange for
the promise or its performance. The promise must not be mere-
ly performable on a certain contingency.
b. All offers are promises of the kind stated in this Section
and all promises of this kind are offers if there has been no prior
offer of the same tenor to the promisor. But if there has already
been such an offer to enter into a bilateral contract, an acceptance
thereof, like the offer itself, will be a promise of the kind stated in
the Section.
Special Note: The word "option" is often used for a con-
tinuing offer although it is revocable for lack of consideration;
but more commonly the word is used to denote an offer which is
irrevocable and therefore a contract.
Annotation:
No West Virginia case found contained a definition of the
word "offer". However, in Richmond Eng. Corp. v. Loth, 135
Va. 110, 152, 115 S. E. 774 (1923), the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals quotes Williston, Contracts, Section 25, as follows:
"An offer is a statement by the offerer that he will give a
20
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return for some promise or act of the offeree, etc." And
further ". . . . an offer is always a conditional promise and it
may be a contract."
The West Virginia decisions illustrate the tendency - com-
mented upon in the "Special Note" - of some courts to use the
word "option" in describing a continuing offer which is revocable
for want of consideration. In Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736,
8 S. E. 743 (1888), the Supreme Court of Appeals termed such
an offer an "option." And in Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148,
19 S. E. 540, 542-543 (1894), the Supreme Court of Appeals,
per Brannon, J., used the following language in commenting up-
on a similar revocable offer: "It was an option to purchase, a
proposal, - as the letter itself calls itself, an 'option', - and
under the language of the offer, as well as the general law of con-
tracts touching a proposal, it must be accepted, and acceptance
made known, and within a reasonable time."
In the following cases the word "option" was used to describe
a continuing offer made under seal for which a valuable considera-
tion had been given: Tibbs v. Zirkle, 55 W. Va. 49, 46 S. E. 701
(1905); Rease v. Kittle, 56 W. Va. 269, 49 S. E. 150 (1905);
Womack v. Agee, 79 W. Va. 22, 90 S. E. 792 (1916).
Section 25. WBEN A MANIFESTATION OF INTENTION IS NOT
AN OFFER.
If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from
the circumstances existing at the time, the person to whom the
promise or manifestation is addressed knows or has reason to
know that the person making it does not intend it as an ex-
pression of his fixed purpose until he has given a further ex-
pression of assent, he has not made an offer.
comment:
a. It is often difficult to draw an exact line between offers
and negotiations preliminary thereto. It is common for one who
wishes to make a bargain to try to induce the other party to the
intended transaction to make the definite offer, he himself sug-
gesting with more or less definiteness the nature of the contract
he is willing to enter into. Besides any direct language indicat-
ing an intent to defer the formation of a contract, the definite-
ness or indefiniteness of the words used in opening the negotiation
must be considered, as well as the customs of business, and indeed
all surrounding circumstances.
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Annotation:
The West Virginia cases are in accord with this section, which
seeks to distinguish an offer from an "invitation to treat".
Cox v. Cox, 5 W. Va. 335 (1872). Preliminary negotiations
by letter for alleged purchase of land.
Parks v. Morris, Layfield & Co., 63 W. Va. 51, 59 S. E. 753
(1907). An inquiry only concerning price plaintiff would take
for his timber. Brannon, J., (p. 53, 59 S. E. 735-754): "Was
this a contract? We say not. Morris made no actual proposal
to buy. Parks simply asked Morris what he was paying Sterne
for timber, and Morris asked him if he would take the same. He
made only an inquiry, but he made no acceptance of the proposi-
tion of Parks to take $6 per acre. A contract cannot bind a party
proposing it until acceptance of the other party. The minds of
the parties must meet in a consummated contract. If anything
remains to be done to make a contract, if the agreement is not
consummated, if all the terms have not been mutually agreed upon,
no contract arises between the parties."
Pickens v. Stout, 67 W. Va. 422, 68 S. E. 354 (1910). "Loose
conversation" on subject of purchase. Poffenbarger, J., (p. 429,
68 S. E. 358): "Taken all together, we think this evidence of
purchase is too uncertain and contradictory as to time and is
altogether silent as to the price and terms. No doubt B. B. Stout
expected to buy it, and likely Mrs. Jarvis looked upon him as a
prospective purchaser. There may have been some loose conver-
sation on the subject, as there seems to have been between B. B.
Stout and some of the other heirs; but the evidence falls short of
the establishment of a contract of sale, fixing the price and terms
and the execution of a written contract or memorandum, and
there was no change of possession within the lifetime of Mrs. Jar-
vis, of which she had any notice, disclosed by the evidence. To
sustain a bill for specific performance -of an oral contract of pur-
chase, the evidence must be clear, full, and free from suspicion."
Herman v. Goddard, 82 W. Va. 520, 96 S. E. 792 (1918).
(Terms of payment left for future negotiations).
In ,Three States Coal Co. v. Superior Elkhorn By-Products
Co., 110 W. Va. 455, 158 S. E. 661 (1931), annotated (1931) 38
W. Va. Law Quarterly 76 the following letter was construed as
an offer: "Would you be interested in an order for 40,000 tons
of Elkhorn Steam Mine Run - net you $1.30 net ton mines ship-
ment from date until November 15th - in approximately equal
22
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monthly installments, with the exception of July and August, and
during these months 10,000 to 11,000 tons would be required to
be shipped? If your position is such that you are not inclined
to handle the order for the entire tonnage possibly you would con-
sider the acceptance of 15,000 to 20,000 tons - shipment over
the period. Doubtless this or similar tonnage will be attractive
to you, considered in the nature of a back log .... If interested,
kindly wire us upon receipt of this letter, stating quantity of
tonnage you will accept, and we will telegraph you billing."
Section 26. CONTRACT MAY EXIST THOUGH WRITTEN
MEMORIAL IS CONTEMPLATEM.
Mutual manifestations of assent that are in themselves suf-
ficient to make a contract will not be prevented from so operat-
ing by the mere fact that the parties also manifest ani intention
to prepare and adopt a written memorial therof; but other facts
may show that the manifestations are merely preliminary ex-
pressions as stated in Section 25.
Comment:
a. Parties who plan to make a final written instrument as
the expression of their contract, necessarily discuss the proposed
terms of the contract before they enter into it, and often before
the final writing is made, agree upon all the terms which they plan
to incorporate therein. This they may do orally or by exchange
of several writings. It is possible thus to make a contract to
execute subsequently a final writing which shall 'contain certain
provisions. If parties have definitely agreed that they will do
so, and that the final writing shall contain these provisions and
no others, they have then fulfilled all the requisites for the forma-
tion of a contract. On the other hand, if the preliminary agree-
ment is incomplete, it being apparent that the determination of
certain details is deferred until the writing is made out; or if an
intention is manifested in any way that legal obligations between
the parties shall be deferred until the writing is made, the pre-
liminary negotiations and agreements do not constitute a con-
tract.
b. The matter may be put in this way: If the parties indi-
cate that the expected document is to be a mere "memorial" of
operative facts already existing, its non-existence does not pre-
vent those facts from having their normal legal operation. What
that operation is must be determined largely by oral testimony,
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or by preliminary or only partially complete writings. If the
parties indicate that the expected document is to be the exclusive
operative consummation of the negotiation, their preceding com-
munications will not be operative as offer or acceptance. This
also must be shown largely by oral testimony.
c. If the written document is prepared and executed, the
legal relations of the parties are then largely determined by that
document, because of the so-called "Parol Evidence Rule," even
though there was a binding informal contract previously made.
Annotation:
West Virginia is in accord with this section. The decision
of Brown v. Maryland Ry. Co., 92 W. Va. 111, 114 S. E. 457
(1922) is a square holding on the point. Ritz, J., after listing
the authorities, stated the following conclusion (p. 119, 114 S.
E. 460): "From these authorities it is very clear that a binding
oral contract may be made between parties, though there is an
understanding that it is to be subsequently reduced to writing,
which writing is never completed, where it appears that all of the
terms of the contract are fully understood and agreed to, and
there is no agreement that their validity depends upon their be-
ing reduced to writing."
The principle involved in this section is thus stated by Woods,
J., in the leading case of Virginian Export Coal Co. v. Rowland
Land Co., 100 W. Va. 559, 581, 582, 131 S. E. 253, 262 (1926):
"This leads us to consider the remaining question: Was the under-
standing of the parties that they were not to be mutually bound
by any negotiations until the same had been reduced to a formal
contract of lease and signed? The circuit court answered this
question in the affirmative. As contended by counsel for the
plaintiff, it is an undoubted principle of law that a valid contract
may be made by memorandum, telegrams, and correspondence,
but the authorities as expressly hold that care should always be
taken not to construe as an agreement that which the parties only
intended to be a preliminary negotiation. The question in such
cases always is, say all the books, did they mean to contract by the
memorandum of agreement, or were they only settling the terms
of an agreement into which they proposed to enter after all its
particulars were adjusted, which was then to be formally drawn
up and by which alone they designed to be bound? No positive
rule can be laid down to guide the court in arriving at the inten-
tion in all cases. Such intention must necessarily depend upon
24
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the nature of the transaction, the circumstances and surroundings
appearing in each particular case. W. Va. 0. & 0. L. Co. v. Vinal,
14 W. Va. 637."
The problem raised by this section is also considered in
Monongah Coal & Coke Co. v. Fleming, 42 W. Va. 538, 26 S. E.
201 (1896) ; Friend v. Mallory, 52 W. Va. 53, 43 S. E. 114 (1903) ;
Merchants' Coal Co. v. Billmeyer, 54 W. Va. 1, 46 S. E. 121
(1903). The decision of Hardwood Package Co. v. Courtney Co.,
253 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) is in accord with this section.
As to the signatures to a contract where the agreement con-
templates that all the parties are to sign and that unless all parties
sign there is no completed contract, see Herndon v. Meadows, 86
W. Va. 499, 103 S. E. 404; Hoon v. Hyman, 87 W. Va. 659, 105
S. E. 925 (1921); Ely v. Phillips, 89 W. Va. 580, 109 S. E. 808
(1921).
Under Comment C. (Parol Evidence Rule, Restatement,
Section 233) see Long v. Perine, 41 W. Va. 314, 23 S. E. 611
(1895); Maupin v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co., 53 W.
Va. 557, 45 S. E. 1003 (1903) ; Myers v. Taylor, 64 W. Va. 56, 61
S. E. 358 (1908).
That this is a rule of evidence which may be waived by fail-
ure to invoke, see McGraw v. First Nat. Bank, 85 W. Va. 298, 101
S. E. 474 (1919).
Section 27. AUCTIONS; SAS WITHOUT RESERVE.
At an auction, the auctioneer merely invites offers from
successive bidders unless, by announcing that the sale is with-
out reserve or by other means, he indicates that he is making
an offer to sell at any price bid by the highest bidder.
The proposed Final Draft No. 13 to the Restatement of
Contracts contains the following suggested addition to Section
27: "In that case after a bid has been made the auctioneer can-
not withdraw. Even though the sale is announced to be with-
out reserve any bidder may withdraw his bid until the auction-
eer by fall of the hammer, or in other customary manner, an-
nounces that the sale is complete."
Commen t:
a. An auction as ordinarily conducted furnishes an illustra-
tion of the principle stated in Section 25. The auctioneer, by be-
ginning to auction property, does not impliedly say: "I offer to
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sell this property to whichever one of you makes the highest bid,"
but rather requests that the bidders make offers to him, as indeed
he frequently states in his remarks to those before him.
b. It is corollary of the princil le stated in this Section taken
in connection with Section 41 that, where the auctioneer merely
invites offers, a bidder may withdraw his bid at any time before
the fall of the hammer. A bid in such a case is a revocable offer.
If the auctioneer has made an offer inviting acceptances, a bid
is an acceptance and completes a contract, binding both auctioneer
and bidder; but the contract is conditional on no higher bid be-
ing made before the fall of the hammer.
Annotdtion:
No West Virginia case directly in point was found. The
following quotation from Wharton on Contracts, Section 10, is
cited with approval in the opinion of the Court in Weaver v.
Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 744, 8 S. E. 743, 747 (1888) ". . . . The
right to revoke before acceptance is one which prior conditions
cannot limit. Thus, at an auction sale, the bidder may at any
time recall his bid before the hammer falls, though the conditions
of sale are that no bidding shall be retracted, and the seller may
retract, though the sale was to be without reserve. It would be a
petitio principii to say that the party retracting was bound by
contract not to retract, since it is to this very contract not. to re-
tract that his retracting applies."
Section 28. To WHom AN OFFER MAY BE MADE.
An offer may be made to a specified person or persons or
class of persons, or it may be made to anyone or to everyone
to whom it becomes known. The person or persons in whom
is created a power of acceptance are to be determined by the
reasonable interpretation of the offer.
Comment:
a. An offer may give many persons a power of acceptance.
In some such cases the exercise of the power by one person will
extinguish the power of every other person; in other cases this
will not be true. The decision depends on interpretation of the
offer.
Annotation:
No West Virginia cases were found which involved offers to
a class of persons. In Martin v. Rothwell, 81 W. Va. 681, 95 S.
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E. 189 (1918), and in Windsor Hotel Co. v. Schenk, 76 W. Va.
1, 84 S. E. 911 (1915), it was held that an offer (stock subscrip-
tion) might be made to a corporation to be formed in the future.
This type of case is, of course, remote from the situations con-
templated in Section 28.
Section 29. How AN OFFER MAY BE ACCEPTED.
An offer may invite an acceptance to be made by merely
an affirmative answer, or by performing or refraining from per-
forming a specified act, or may contain a choice of terms from
which the offeree is given the power to make a selection in his
acceptance.
Annotation:
The West Virginia decisions are in accord with this section.
In the first situation of acceptance by mere affirmative
answer, see Watson v. Coast, 35 W. Va. 463, 14 S. E. 249 (1891).
In that case the Supreme Court of Appeals said, per Brannon,
J., (p. 470, 14 S. E. 251) : "The first question I shall consider is,
does the written offer or option made by Watson and the telegram
sent to him by Coast constitute a contract? Looking at this offer,
it conveys a clear, distinct proposition; looking at the telegram,
it conveys an equally clear and distinct acceptance of that proposi-
tion. From this proposition on the one side, and its unqualified
acceptance on the other, results a complete contract, according to
the well-established law of contracts." See also Catlett v. Bloyd,
83 W. Va. 776, 99 S. E. 81 (1919) ; Shrewsbury v. Tufts, 41 W.
Va. 212, 23 S. B. 692 (1895). The cases illustrating this very
ordinary situation are numerous.
In the second situation of acceptance by performing or fail-
ing to perform a specified act, see Wood & Brooks Co. v. D. E.
Hewit Lumber Co., 89 W. Va. 254, 109 S. E. 242 (1921). In
that case the Court said, per Lynch, J., (p. 260, 109 S. E. 244) :
"The proposal was to buy basswood timber for 1916 delivery, and
as such it was a valid offer to purchase, and the acts of defendant
in cutting and shipping part of the timber, viewed in the light
furnished by the written correspondence, constituted an effective
acceptance or ratification of the offer." To the same effect is
Duquesne Lumber Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 90 W. V. 673, 112
S. E. 219 (1922), especially Syl. 1, and Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v.
Nease, 207 Fed. 237 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913).
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In the third situation of acceptance by choice of terms, see
Morris v. Risk, 86 W. Va. 30, 102 S. E. 725 (1920), where "plain-
tiff had under the option a right to buy or sell any one or all of
the lots, or the right to buy some of them and sell the others."
Section 30. OFFER MAY PROPOSE A SINGLE CONTRACT OR A
Num3BERoF CONTRACTS.
An offer may propose the formation of a single contract by
a single acceptance or the formation of a! number of contracts by
successive acceptances from time to time.
Comment:
a. An offer may request several acts or promises as the in-
divisible exchange for the promise or promises in the offer, or
it may request a series of contracts to be made from time to time.
Such a series may be a series of unilateral contracts or a series
of bilateral contracts, depending upon the terms of the offer.
Whether several promises create several contracts or are all part
of one contract is determined by principles of interpretation
stated in Chapter 9.
Annotation:
No West Virginia cases squarely in point were found.
Language Iappearing in some of the cases, however, indicates that
this jurisdiction is in accord, on principle, with the section. In
Lawrence v. Potter, 91 W. Va. 361, 370, 371, 113 S. E. 266, 270
(1927), for example, the following statement appears: "That
claim and equity, taken in connection with the other facts and
circumstances, and uncontradicted testimony found in the record,
conclusively demonstrate the unsoundness of the contention that
the agreement here involved was an independent one, or a mere
offer of sale, subject to withdrawal before consummation of the
other agreements with which it was clearly connected. The real
transaction was a composite one, made up of several elements and
subsidiary agreements. Potter could properly accept it only in
its entirety, and he could not reject any part, while holding on
to another, to the detriment of the party as to whom he desired
to reject."
See Morris v. Risk, 86 W. Va. 30, 102 S. B. 725 (1920).
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